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ABSTRACT
Retailer capacity decisions can impact sales for products by affecting, for example, availability and
visibility. Using data from the U.S. video rental industry, we report estimates of the effect of capacity
on sales. New monitoring technologies facilitated new supply contracts in this industry, which lowered
the upfront costs of capacity and required minimum capacity purchases, strongly impacting stocking
decisions. Under the traditional supply contract, capacity costs $44 per tape (avg) and the marginal
tape produces 10.4 to 18.0 additional rentals. Under the new contract, capacity costs $7 per tape (avg)
and the marginal tape produces 0 to 4.9 additional rentals.
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Advances in monitoring technology, particularly in the retail sector, are improving ﬁrms’
abilities to manage capacity strategically in order to impact sales. Capacity choice is a
critical decision for ﬁrms that face storage costs (e.g., retailers, event venues, airlines). Ca-
pacity constraints aﬀect many types of ﬁrms, and may be complicated by vertical ownership
structures, the nature of supply contracts, and product characteristics. Although higher ca-
pacity can lead to fewer stock-outs and greater sales, additional capacity may also increase
costs, cannibalize sales of available substitutes, and aﬀect local competition in the short-
and long-run.
In this paper we study the video rental industry, which is a prime example of an industry
where technological advances have contributed to dramatic changes in capacity decisions
and related vertical contracts in recent years. We ﬁnd that larger capacity, measured in
terms of more tapes for a given title, can substantially increase rentals of that title. We also
ﬁnd that alternative vertical contractual forms for distributing tapes from studios to rental
stores (retailers) can have a large impact on the relationship between capacity and rentals.
In particular, we investigate the eﬀect of capacity on rentals under traditional contractual
forms for distributing tapes from studios to retailers, and compare this to the capacity eﬀect
under a new contractual form, widely adopted in the late 1990s, that distributes tapes at a
substantially lower upfront cost. We analyze a panel dataset on video retailers in the U.S.
that contains detailed information on stores’ capacity decisions and subsequent rentals on
a title-by-title basis.
Products in this industry are distributed on three diﬀerent types of vertical contracts,
which have diﬀerent implications for the cost to the retailer of acquiring capacity. One of
these contracts is characterized by a high upfront per-tape cost (roughly $44 per tape) for
the ﬁrst few months following a title’s video release, followed by a large price reduction after
5 months in order to encourage sales directly to consumers.1 We refer to this contractual
form as a “linear pricing” contract. A second contractual form also has a linear-pricing
structure, but with a much lower upfront per-tape cost (roughly $15 per tape). We refer
to this contractual form as a “sell-through pricing” contract, and it is typically meant to
encourage simultaneous sales to both consumers and retailers. New monitoring technologies
1The $44 per-tape cost is the cost for retailers following substantial but common rebates. The price for
direct consumer purchases is typically even higher in the ﬁrst 5 months.
1implemented in the late 1990s allowed for a third contractual form, “revenue sharing”
contracts. Under revenue-sharing contracts, tapes are distributed at a very low upfront
per-tape cost (roughly $7 per tape), but subsequent rental revenues are shared between the
studio and the retailer, in contrast to tapes distributed on linear and sell-through pricing
contracts where the retailer keeps all of the rental revenue. Totaling the upfront per-tape
cost and the revenue-sharing payments, retailers typically pay a little less than $30 per tape
to the studios for titles taken on revenue-sharing contracts. Titles taken on revenue-sharing
contracts are also subject to minimum and maximum quantity requirements imposed by the
studios. As a result, capacity decisions under revenue-sharing contracts do not necessarily
represent the optimal level of capacity for the retailer when those quantity restrictions are
binding.
Due to the fact that a signiﬁcant minority of retailers do not have the requisite monitor-
ing technology to access revenue-sharing contracts, all titles available under revenue-sharing
contractual terms are also available under linear-pricing terms. In contrast, not all titles
available under linear-pricing contracts are oﬀered under revenue-sharing contracts. Titles
available under sell-through pricing contracts are not available under any other contractual
terms.2
The wide array of contract types oﬀered for diﬀerent movies and chosen by diﬀerent
stores creates substantial variation in capacity across stores and titles. We observe details
on the variation in contracts and capacity for 1,019 titles taken by 7,478 retailers, along with
the costs of the capacity, and weekly quantities of rentals and revenues for each store-title
pair. Although the data provide rich detail on retailers’ capacity choices and subsequent
sales, we do not have information on the rental decisions of individual end-consumers, or
exact stock-out times. Thus, we do not explicitly model consumer behavior with respect to
available capacity, and our analyses allow for several potential eﬀects of capacity on sales
without attempting to disentangle the impact of a speciﬁc eﬀect such as reduced stockouts,
signals of product quality, or shelf-space coverage.
The studio’s choice of which contractual form(s) to oﬀer for a title, and the contrac-
tual form chosen by a retailer (for titles oﬀered on both revenue-sharing and linear-pricing
contracts), are two potential sources of endogeneity. As we discuss in section 3, we believe
that the studios’ choice of contract for a title is largely predetermined and does not impact
2For more discussion of this point, see Mortimer (2008).
2our estimates of the eﬀect of capacity on rentals. Retailers have a choice between linear-
pricing and revenue-sharing contracts for 57% of the titles in our data, and our treatment
of their choice of contract for these titles is discussed in section 4. Given the contractual
form, the remaining central challenge for identifying the eﬀect of capacity on sales is the
fact that retailers endogenously choose capacity in order to maximize proﬁts. To address
this endogeneity concern, we note that several institutional details of the industry motivate
a model of retailer capacity choice that focuses on store-level and title-level decisions. We
discuss these institutional features, and describe the nature of retailer capacity choices. We
take advantage of the panel nature of the dataset by incorporating both store and title ﬁxed
eﬀects, which, due to the nature of the retailer’s capacity decisions, address some important
components of the endogeneity of capacity. We also implement an instrumental variables
approach to address remaining concerns about the endogeneity of capacity at the store-title
level. We instrument for a store’s capacity decision for a title by using the average level
of capacity of that same title at all other similar-sized stores, as in Ho, Ho, and Mortimer
(2008).
After accounting for store and title eﬀects and instrumenting for capacity, we calculate
the impact that capacity choices have on rentals. We show that alternative contractual
forms, some facilitated by the adoption of new monitoring technologies, can greatly impact
the retailers’ choice of capacity relative to sales. Speciﬁcally, retailers appear to choose
capacity such that expected revenue approximately equals expected cost, which implies
that capacity is much lower relative to sales under the contractual form with the highest
upfront cost. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of capacity on sales for linear-pricing contracts.
We estimate that for titles on these contracts, which have an upfront cost of around $44
per tape, an additional unit of capacity produces between 10.4 and 18.0 more rentals over
the life of a movie at the average video retail store, depending on the size of the theatrical
box oﬃce receipts for the title. For this contractual form, retailers’ capacity choice has a
profound eﬀect on the level of rentals. The sell-through pricing contracts, which have an
upfront cost of around $15, have a smaller estimated impact of capacity on rentals. Titles
taken on these contracts generate between 3.3 and 9.2 more rentals from an additional unit
of capacity. For the revenue-sharing contracts, which have the lowest average upfront cost
per tape, around $7, we ﬁnd that an additional unit of capacity has very little impact on
rentals, generating 0 to 4.9 additional rentals over the life of the movie. The negligible
3impact of capacity on rentals for these revenue-sharing contracts may in part reﬂect high
capacity levels induced not only by the low per-tape costs, but also by minimum quantity
requirements imposed by the studios who may have incentives to encourage higher levels of
capacity than is optimal to the retailer for some store-title combinations.
We refer to the above estimates as the “own” eﬀect of capacity, as it considers the eﬀects
of increasing capacity at a store of one title on the sales for that same title. We also examine
the eﬀect that capacities of other titles have on sales of a particular title, which we call the
“cross-title” eﬀect. We ﬁnd little or no average cross-title eﬀect in most cases, although
there is some evidence that certain types of titles may have a small positive cross-title eﬀect.
Relationship to Literature
While the importance of capacity choice is well recognized in a wide array of theoretical
literatures, empirical studies of the eﬀect of capacity on sales are sparse. Issues involving
capacity are prominent in the business and marketing literature, as well as the industrial
organization literature. In the business and marketing literature, the attention on capacity
choice has generally addressed capacity as a production input for manufacturers, also focus-
ing on supply-side eﬀects.3 Some have extended the supply-side arguments to incorporate
the eﬀect of capacity choice on sales. For example, Urban (1995) develops a theoretical
rule for optimally replenishing capacity of a single product over an inﬁnite time horizon;
he generalizes several models to incorporate eﬀects of stock-level-dependent demand rates
in proﬁt-maximization models.4 Urban (2005) further reviews two types of models of the
impact of capacity on sales, one where demand is aﬀected by the initial capacity level and
one where it is aﬀected by the instantaneous capacity level.
Our work in this paper is more closely related to the literature that directly examines
sales eﬀects of capacity, such as the “newsboy model”. In this model, retailers purchase
capacity at the beginning of a period in which sales are realized. If a retailer stocks out in
this period, subsequent sales for the period are lost. Narayanan and Raman (2000) extend
this model to allow the retailer to carry goods that are close substitutes, and Dana and
Spier (2001) extend the model to examine the implications of revenue-sharing supply con-
tracts (compared to linear-pricing contracts). The implication of Dana and Spier’s model is
that, in the face of either uncertain demand or demand that declines predictably over time,
3See Nahmias (1989) for an extensive review of many of these contributions.
4Earlier work on the relationship between sales and capacity (or inventory) in retail markets includes
Schary and Becker (1972), Wolfe (1968), and Gupta and Vrat (1986).
4retailers will hold higher levels of capacity under revenue-sharing supply contracts com-
pared to linear-pricing contracts. Consistent with the assumptions of the newsboy model,
an important restriction is that subsequent sales of a product are lost after a stock-out
occurs; consumers do not search across other stores or substitute intertemporally. Finally,
Balachander and Farquhar (1994) provide a theoretical analysis of optimal stock-outs as a
function of local competitive conditions. They ﬁnd that when consumer search costs are
high, stores choose to stock out in order to maintain price.
The remainder of the paper proceeds with some background information on the video
rental industry and a description of the data in the next section. Section 3 describes
retailer objectivesand capacitychoice, which motivatesthe empirical work and identiﬁcation
strategy in section 4. We present the results in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Industry and Data Description
The home video industry grew quickly throughout the 1980’s to become the largest source
of domestic revenue for movie studios. In 1999, the $16 billion industry accounted for
55% of studios’ domestic revenues, compared to 22% generated by theatrical revenues, and
23% from all other forms of media, such as the sales of pay-per-view, cable, and broadcast
television rights. By 2006, the home video industry had increased to $24 billion in domestic
revenues and generated three times as much revenue as the theatrical channel through
approximately 20,000 home video retailer outlets. These outlets are split evenly between
independently-owned small chains of retailer locations and large chains of several hundred
stores, such as Blockbuster, Inc. and Hollywood Video.
Three primary types of contracts characterize the distribution of tapes in the industry:
linear-pricing contracts charge a high initial wholesale cost per tape (typically around $44 in
the ﬁrst ﬁve months of release then dropping to around $15 to $20), and leave all subsequent
rental revenue with the retailer. Sell-through pricing contracts are similar to linear-pricing
contracts but do not have the high initial per-tape cost, instead being released at a $15
per-tape wholesale price. Retailers keep all subsequent rental revenue. These contracts are
used for particular kinds of movies for which the producer wants to stimulate sales directly
to consumers (e.g., childrens’ movies). Revenue-sharing contracts have a low upfront per-
tape price (around $7), but the studio keeps a share of the subsequent rental revenue.
5While some titles are available only on sell-through pricing or linear-pricing contracts, all
titles oﬀered on revenue-sharing contracts are also available under linear-pricing terms. For
movies oﬀered on both linear-pricing and revenue-sharing contracts, retailers have a choice
of the two contract types, although they can only use one contract for any given title.5
Revenue-sharing contracts require extensive monitoring of retailer activities, including
capacity choices and rental activity. Rentrak Corporationprovides these monitoring services
to the industry, and we use detailed data from Rentrak in our analyses. Rentrak observes
titles under all three contractual forms. Over 10,000 retailers used Rentrak between 1998
and 2002, accounting for over half of all retailers in the industry. We observe detailed
data on 7,478 of these retailers ranging in size from single-store locations to a chain with
1,652 locations. Blockbuster Video and Hollywood Video comprise an additional 4,000 or
so retailers in the Rentrak system, and we do not observe their transactions.6
For each store in our sample, we observe transaction data for the 210 weeks between
January, 1998 and June, 2002.7 We discard observations for titles released after December
2001, so that rental activity for each title is tracked for at least 6 months. At the store level,
we observe location at the county, zip code, and Designated Market Area (DMA) level.8
We observe total annual and monthly store revenue, and the size of a store’s chain. Total
monthly store revenue is broken out among rentals and sales for adult, game, DVD, and
regular titles. We also observe the date the store joined the Rentrak database, and the date
the store left Rentrak, if applicable. Entry into the database is common over the two-year
period, and typically represents the choice of an existing retailer to join Rentrak, rather
than entry into the industry. The vast majority of store exits (over 90 percent) represent
store closure, or exit from the industry. Finally, Rentrak classiﬁes each store into one of
ten store size groups (“store tiers”) based roughly on the deciles of average monthly store
revenues. Store tiers are used by Rentrak to assign stores’ minimum and maximum quantity
5Thirty-three out of 61 studios oﬀer at least one title under revenue-sharing terms.
6Hollywood Video and Rentrak were involved in a legal dispute over data integrity, for which they
eventually reached a settlement. The nature of BlockBuster Video’s revenue-sharing contracts diﬀered from
that of other retailers, in that they dealt directly with each studio and typically agreed to purchase all of a
studio’s titles under revenue-sharing terms. As a result, BlockBuster only processes selected titles through
Rentrak’s system. Interestingly, industry trade journals cited Blockbuster’s belief that larger capacities
would stimulate demand for video rentals as a reason for adopting the revenue-sharing contracts.
7If a store entered the database after January, 1998, we observe their data from the date of entry forward.
Similarly, if a store exited the database before June, 2002, we observe their data until the date of exit.
8Designated Market Areas organize the United States according to the coverage areas of broadcast tele-
vision.
6requirements for titles taken under revenue-sharing terms.
We observe 1,019 titles in our data, and of those, 326 are oﬀered on linear-pricing
contracts alone, 114 are oﬀered on sell-through pricing contracts alone, and 579 titles are
oﬀered on both linear-pricing and revenue-sharing contracts. For each title, we observe the
number of titles released in the same month, a box-oﬃce category, the MPAA rating, genre,
and the contractual forms and terms oﬀered by the studio. The box-oﬃce categories are
denoted as A, B, C, or D. Titles in the A category (“A titles”) have theatrical box-oﬃce
revenues of more than $40 million, and titles in the B and C categories (“B titles” and
“C titles”) have theatrical box-oﬃce revenues of $15 - $40 million and $1 - $15 million,
respectively. Titles in the D category do not have a theatrical release, and are “direct-to-
video” titles, such as instructional or exercise videos. Many of the D titles are only bought
by a single retailer, and we exclude these titles from the analysis.
At the store-title level, we observe the type of contract chosen by the retailer (when
more than one option is available), and the number of tapes purchased for all titles released
during the period covered by our data. We also observe transactions, which are recorded
weekly for each store-title combination, and total weekly quantities of rental transactions
and revenues (and the corresponding average price) for all titles from their release date
(between January 1998 and December 2001) through the end of the data, June 2002. For
the analyses considered in this paper we aggregate the weekly data and calculate total
quantities of rental transactions and revenues at the store-title level.
We also utilize data from the 2000 US Census on the demographic characteristics of each
zip code. Demographic data include the number of people, median income, and marginal
distributions of race, education, age, gender, employment, family status, and the level of
urbanization in each zip code. The Rentrak and Census data are merged by zip code.
3 Retailer Objectives and Capacity Choice
The primary decision faced by retailers when stocking a new title is how many tapes to
purchase (i.e., what level of capacity to carry). For titles oﬀered on both linear-pricing
and revenue-sharing contracts, the retailer also has a choice of contractual form.9 Prior to
9As discussed later, rental price generally does not vary among new release titles within a store and does
not represent an important title-speciﬁc choice variable at the retailer location. Following the rental release
of a title, the retailer may make subsequent decisions such as the timing of moving a movie from new release
to catalogue status, or selling used copies of rental capacity.
7estimating the impact of capacity decisions on rentals, it is important to understand the
factors aﬀecting the studios’ choice of which contractual form to oﬀer, the retailers’ choice
of contractual form (for those titles where both linear-pricing and revenue-sharing contracts
are oﬀered), and the retailers’ choice of capacity.
For studios, the decision to oﬀer a title on linear-pricing or sell-through pricing terms
is determined by many factors, but the most important factor is the responsiveness of the
consumer sales market to delaying low pricing. For more detail on the nature of this decision
and its welfare impacts, see Mortimer (2007). The decision by a studio to oﬀer retailers the
choice of revenue-sharing or linear-pricing contracts is taken when the studio joins Rentrak’s
system for monitoring revenues, and is not taken on a title-by-title basis. The timing of
this decision is not correlated with any studio observables, such as the number of titles
released or the portfolio of titles produced (i.e., the mix of diﬀerent genres and ratings of a
studio’s titles). Thus, we take the set of contracts available for a title as predetermined in
our analyses of the eﬀects of capacity on rentals.
For retailers, both the choice of contract and the choice of capacity may be endogenous
to rental demand factors. Section 4 discusses the treatment of these potential sources of
endogeneity when estimating the relationship between capacity and rental demand. This
section outlines key factors related to the retailer’s choice of contract and capacity, and
provides a model of the retailer’s capacity decision. While the estimation strategy does
not explicitly rely on a formal model of retailer capacity choice, the discussion in this
section helps solidify the validity of the identiﬁcation strategy used to estimate the impact
of capacity on rentals.
Retailers do not have a choice of contractual form for a large number of titles. As noted
in the prior section, we observe 1,019 titles in our data, and of those, 326 are oﬀered on
linear-pricing contracts alone and 114 are oﬀered on sell-through pricing contracts alone.
For the remaining 579 titles (or 57% of titles), retailers have a choice of revenue-sharing or
linear-pricing contracts. The diﬀerent contractual forms are associated with very diﬀerent
capacity costs, and the main impact of a contractual form on rental demand is through
its impact on capacity. In choosing a contractual form, the retailer trades oﬀ the lower
upfront cost of capacity under the revenue-sharing contract against the fact that the linear-
pricing contract leaves all of the rental revenue with the retailer. Mortimer (2008) ﬁnds that
retailers are more likely to choose linear-pricing contracts for titles with relatively higher
8rental demand. As discussed in section 4, when estimating the impact of capacity on rentals,
we run separate analyses by contract type. For those titles where the retailer does not have
a choice of contracts, this approach allows us to ﬂexibly accommodate the very diﬀerent
cost structures associated with each contract type. For those titles where the retailer has a
choice of contracts, we recover the eﬀect of capacity for the store-title observations where
the contract was chosen, which limits our ability to extrapolate to other subpopulations of
store-title combinations.
Retailers choose capacity for each title on a store-by-store basis (even within chains).
The two most important factors aﬀecting the retailer’s choice of capacity for a title are
the title’s theatrical revenues and the capacity costs. Retailers typically choose both the
contractual form and the level of capacity for a title after the theatrical run has largely
concluded and roughly two monthsprior to the title’srental release. At the timethe capacity
decision is made, the theatrical revenues of the title are known. It is generally accepted
in the industry that aggregate national rental capacity shipments for a title are closely
correlated with the title’s national theatrical revenues. The retailers’ costs of capacity
include those costs we observe in the data, such as upfront per-tape costs and revenue-
sharing components, as well as costs of holding inventory that we do not observe in the
data, such as ordering and stocking costs.
Retailers typically do not increase their capacity for a title following its rental release.
There are essentially three reasons why capacity for a title is not updated following rental re-
lease and the observation of initial rental demand. First, in many cases the title’s theatrical
success provides a relatively accurate benchmark for rental demand, allowing for accurate
capacity decisions prior to rental release. Second, the rapid decay over time that typically
characterizes rental demand means that updating capacity levels following rental release
is generally impractical (i.e., by the time the store would receive the additional capacity,
rental demand is likely to have decayed to the point where the additional capacity is no
longer required). Finally, due to the continual introduction of new titles and the high initial
rental demand associated with new releases, stores tend to focus on capacity decisions for
upcoming new releases rather than titles that are already on the rental market. For these
same reasons, chains generally do not shift capacity across stores within the chain following
a title’s release.10
10There are a few additional reasons why chains do not generally shift inventories across stores: it can be
diﬃcult for a chain to distinguish between diﬀerences in underlying rental demand for a title and random
9In addition to the capacity decision, the retailer makes several other decisions that are
generally not title speciﬁc, but rather are aimed at aﬀecting the perceived overall quality
of the store. For example, retailers may advertise the fact that they carry large levels of
capacity across all new release titles(e.g., Blockbuster’s ‘Guaranteed To Be There’ campaign
in the late 1990s). Advertising carried out by the store for a speciﬁc title tends to be limited.
Similarly, cross-store competition tends to be focused on store-level decisions (e.g., a decision
to carry increased capacity on all new releases, or to carry a wide variety of titles), and
does not generally reﬂect title-speciﬁc competition.11
Our estimation and identiﬁcation strategies consider the features of rental demand de-
scribed above. Speciﬁcally, rental demand for a title at a store is considered to be indepen-
dent of other titles, and comprised of: (1) store-level features, such as store-level advertising,
store reputation quality, and rental pricing, all of which aﬀect the store’s market size (i.e.,
the size of the store’s customer base), along with the average tastes of the store’s customer
base across all titles; (2) title-level features, such as average rental demand for the title
as reﬂected through theatrical receipts, genre, rating, or studio-level advertising; and (3)
store-title level features, such as the store’s capacity for the title, and the relative taste of
the store’s customers for that title. As discussed in section 4, the implication for estima-
tion is that store and title ﬁxed eﬀects may appropriately account for a large component
of unobserved factors of rental demand, greatly reducing the impact of the endogeneity of
capacity. Any remaining endogeneity reﬂecting the relative taste of the store’s customers for
a speciﬁc title (not captured through the store and title ﬁxed eﬀects) needs to be addressed
using an instrumental variables approach.
For illustrativepurposes, we outline a model of the retailer capacity decision for a speciﬁc
functional form of demand. This model is not used in estimation, and is not meant to rule
out alternative, more ﬂexible, demand speciﬁcations. In our model, we assume that the
only mechanism through which the capacity decision for a title aﬀects the retailer proﬁts
on a diﬀerent title is through the impact of capacity on the store’s reputation for quality.
That is, setting too low a capacity for a title, and experiencing multiple stock outs as a
weekly demand shocks across stores based on the ﬁrst week or so of observed rental activity; the costs of
shipping the tapes between stores is not insigniﬁcant (and is time consuming); and revenue-sharing contracts
speciﬁcally prohibit the shifting of capacity between stores.
11One implication is that rental demand for a speciﬁc title at a speciﬁc store generally does not reﬂect
cross-store competition, but is dependent on each store’s base of loyal customers. We do believe that the
store’s base of customers is dependent in the long run on cross-store competition. However, in the short-run,
customers are likely to substitute between titles within a store.
10result, may reduce customers’ expectation regarding the quality of the store in the future,
and potentially cause them to switch to being a customer of a diﬀerent store. However,
if all other factors aﬀecting the customer base at the store are being chosen optimally
(e.g., advertising, capacity for other titles) then it is unlikely that a marginal change in the
capacity choice for a single title will impact the future customer base of the store. As a
result, we model the retailer’s capacity choice for a title as maximizing the store proﬁts for
that title alone.
Given a chosen contract type, retailer i’s proﬁt on title j can be written as:
πij = γjPiQij − FjCij (1)
where γ equals 1 if the title is distributed on linear-pricing or sell-through pricing contracts,
and equals the retailer’s share of the revenue-share component if the title is distributed on
a revenue-sharing contract. Pi is the price of a rental as store i, which is assumed not to
vary across titles within a store. Cij is store i’s capacity of title j, and Fj is the upfront









Demand is assumed to be comprised of a store-level component (Mi), a title-level com-
ponent (Tj), and a store-title level component (Vij). Demand is an increasing function of
capacity, but at a decreasing rate, such that 0 < β < 1. Diﬀerentiating proﬁts with respect





[ln(γj) + ln(Pi) + αln(Mi) + δln(Tj) + ln(Vij) − ln(Fj)]. (3)
In this speciﬁcation store and title ﬁxed eﬀects capture many of the factors aﬀecting the
endogeneity of capacity (i.e., γj, Tj, Fj, Pi, and Mi). The remaining endogeneity is related to
the idiosyncratic tastes of customers at the store for a speciﬁc title (i.e., Vij). As discussed in
section 4.2, we employ an instrumental variables approach to address endogeneity related
to idiosyncratic store/title customer taste. The ability of store and title ﬁxed eﬀects to
11control for the endogeniety of capacity would be somewhat reduced, and the importance of
the instrumental variables approach increased, if the impact of capacity on demand were
assumed to vary by store and title (i.e., if β were deﬁned as βij instead).
4 Estimation and Identiﬁcation
4.1 Estimation Framework
Within a store, larger capacities of a title can increase sales through several diﬀerent mech-
anisms including: (1) reducing the occurrence of “stock-outs” especially in the early weeks
of the release of a new product; (2) serving as a signal to consumers about the ﬁlm’s quality;
or (3) increasing consumer awareness of the ﬁlm by displaying the title over a large shelf
area or in multiple areas within the store. Each of these mechanisms aﬀect sales through
a product’s own capacity. We refer to this eﬀect as the “own” eﬀect. We are interested
in measuring the own eﬀect of capacity on sales without distinguishing among alternative
mechanisms.12
“Cross-title” eﬀects may also exist. While the own eﬀect is likely to be positive (i.e., a
larger capacity for a title is likely to increase sales for that title in the store), cross eﬀects
could be either positive or negative. Relatively larger capacities of titles may increase the
store’s customer base and thus demand for other titles in the future (e.g., by increasing
customer expectations that the store has lower stock-out rates generally). We believe that
larger capacity on a wide range of titles, rather than a marginal increase in capacity for a
single title, would be required to aﬀect demand for rentals on future titles. Alternatively,
larger capacity of one title may displace rentals of other titles because of decreased spillover
demand resulting from stock-outs, or other factors related to perceived relative ﬁlm qualities
and customer awareness of the ﬁlms. In this case, we believe that cross-titleeﬀects will occur
in the short run (i.e., rentals may shift across weeks), but would not necessarily aﬀect life-
time rentals. We use lifetime rentals in this analysis, and so we expect cross-title eﬀects to
be small.
We begin with a model focused solely on own eﬀects of capacity. In addition, we extend
12In order to separately estimate the eﬀects of capacity on sales that are attributable to stock-outs versus
alternative mechanisms, for example, one would ideally want to examine detailed records of consumers’ rental
habits across all stores and products, including consumers’ unmet demand for stocked-out titles. These data
are not available.
12the model to control for possible cross-title eﬀects, and we provide estimates for the size and
direction of these eﬀects. The empirical model is meant to account for important features of
the market for a store-title combination that aﬀect rentals, but does not represent a random
utility maximization model of consumer demand for video rentals.
Consider the demand for title j at store i, given by:
Qij = f(Cij,Pij,Xij;θ)e￿ij. (4)
where Qij is the observed number of rentals of title j at store i, Cij denotes the capacity
(number of tapes) of title j at store i, Pij is the price, and Xij is a vector of store-, title-, or
store-title speciﬁc variables that aﬀect demand, such as local demographics, time trends, or
the capacities of other titles.13 The parameter vector θ contains three vectors of coeﬃcients:
δ contains coeﬃcients for all terms and interactions that include Cij, α and β contain the
coeﬃcients for the eﬀect of price and Xij on the number of rentals respectively, which are





dCij at the existing level of capacity. In the empirical analyses
that follow, we consider several speciﬁcations for f(·). Our baseline model is log-linear;
we represent the log of variables with lower case letters (e.g., ln(Q) = q). We allow for
more ﬂexible speciﬁcations of f(·) by including: interaction terms between c and relevant
elements of x, and by estimating the equation separately for each type of contract, which
we denote with superscript t.
The equation for estimation is:
qt
ij =γt + δt
0cij ∗ I(Boxj) + δt
1cij ∗ chainsizei ∗ I(Boxj)+
δt
2cij ∗ timetrendj ∗ I(Boxj) + δt
3cij ∗ storetieri + βtxij − αtpij + ￿t
ij
(5)
where I(Boxj) is a dummy variable identifying the box oﬃce category of the title (i.e., if
it is an A title, B title, or C title), chainsize is the log of the number of stores comprising
the chain the store belongs to, timetrend is the log of the number of months since January
1998 elapsed when title j was released, and storetier is a dummy variable identifying the
size category of the store. Store, title, and store-title characteristics are captured by xij,
13As noted in section 3, the posted rental price for new releases is often constant across titles within a
store, with the exception of non-monetary dimensions such as the length of the rental period. However, in
practice there is variation related to the collection of late fees, and the timing of when a store moves a title
from the New Release to the Catalog section. We discuss price variation in more detail in section 4.2.
13which may include store and title ﬁxed eﬀects, and β is a vector of coeﬃcients for these
characteristics (and ﬁxed eﬀects). The inclusion of interaction terms with capacity allows
the eﬀect of capacity in equation 5 to vary with observable title and store characteristics,
such as the box oﬃce revenues of the title, the release date, and store size.14
Rather than including all types of contracts in a single analysis, we condition on contract
choice ex-ante and run all analyses separately by contractual form. This allows all coeﬃ-
cients to vary across the diﬀerent supply contracts. For the 43% percent of titles for which
retailers do not have any choice of contract, running the analyses separately by contract
simply allows for ﬂexibility in the predicted eﬀects of capacity. This ﬂexibility is attractive
because the cost structures of the contracts diﬀer substantially. For the 57% percent of titles
for which retailershave a choice of contract, however, this separation also partiallyaddresses
the endogeneity of contractual form, since it determines selection into a given analysis, but
does not aﬀect the coeﬃcients, conditional on that selection.15 This allows us to recover the
eﬀect of capacity for the store-title observations where that contract was chosen. In other
words, we recover the eﬀect of the “treatment on the treated.” The main limitation to this
approach is that one would not want to extrapolate the estimated capacity eﬀects to other
subpopulations of store-title combinations.16 For all of the remaining analyses, we estimate
separate equations for each of the three contract types (linear-pricing, sell-through pricing,
and revenue-sharing), and so we drop the t superscript for ease of notation.
14We also ran our preferred speciﬁcation using a logit model based on shares (where a title’s rental share at
a store was calculated as the number of rentals divided by the number of households in the store’s 5-digit zip
code, and a logistic transformation was applied to the share). The results for the marginal eﬀect of capacity
on rentals were slightly higher, but similar, using the logit compared to the log of rentals for the preferred
speciﬁcation. We rely on the log of rentals speciﬁcation because it provides a more conservative estimate of
the capacity eﬀect, is a more direct measure of the eﬀect we are estimating, and because it allows for a more
direct comparison to using the log of revenues as an alternative left-hand side variable, as discussed in the
remainder of the paper.
15An alternative approach to account for diﬀerent contractual forms would be to combine the population
of all store-title pairs and interact capacity with contractual form. When retailers have a choice of linear-
pricing and revenue-sharing contracts (which occurs for 579 of the 1,019 titles we observe), it would also be
appropriate in such a model to instrument for the choice of revenue-sharing to address potential endogeneity
in the retailers’ choice of contract. However, the eﬀect on rentals of the revenue-sharing versus linear-pricing
decision is likely to be diﬀerent for each store-title pair, requiring a random coeﬃcient on contract choice,
which will not be recovered from a single instrumental variable.
16As a sensitivity test for the importance of this selection eﬀect, we broke up the sample of store-title
pairs on linear-pricing titles into two subgroups: those for which retailers could have chosen revenue-sharing
instead, and those for which retailers could not. We ﬁnd very similar eﬀects of capacity in both groups.
144.2 Identiﬁcation
If retailers choose capacity optimally in order to maximize proﬁts, then positive demand
shocks (unobservable to the econometrician) lead to higher capacity levels. Thus, capacity
levels are endogenously chosen, resulting in a potential upward bias for OLS estimates of
the eﬀect of capacity. In addition to the endogeneity of the capacity choice, one might also
worry about the usual endogeneity of price in the demand equation (i.e., stores may charge
a higher price for titles with rental demand that is unobservably higher). We discuss these
two issues separately.
Capacity Choice
Unobserved components of demand likely aﬀect retailers’ choice of capacity such that
E(cij￿ij) 6= 0 in equation 5. In this case, estimates of δ may be biased. The inclusion
of store ﬁxed eﬀects eliminates bias from correlations between cij and ￿ij that may result
if unobserved, time- and title-invariant store characteristics lead to consistently larger or
smaller demand eﬀects of capacity for all titles. For example, local preferences that aﬀect
consumers’ patience for video rentals (i.e., willingness to wait until the movie is in stock), or
store characteristics like location or reservation policies may impact the eﬀect of additional
capacity. As discussed in section 3, the store ﬁxed eﬀect would also account for endogenteity
related to store-level advertising and capacity decisions aﬀected by cross-store competition.
The inclusion of title ﬁxed eﬀects eliminates bias resulting from correlations between cij
and ￿ij that result from unobserved characteristics of a title (i.e., studio advertising or
promotions surrounding the title’s video release, and relative overall demand for the title
not captured by observed factors) that may raise or lower the capacity eﬀect for that title,
and which are store invariant.
However, even after accounting for store and title ﬁxed eﬀects, one might be concerned
about correlation between capacity choices and ￿ij. Under these conditions, optimal re-
tailer behavior will reﬂect their knowledge of their customers’ idiosyncratic tastes for the
title (unobserved in the data) and imply a positive covariance between cij and ￿ij. As
a result, estimates of δ will overstate the eﬀect of capacity on sales. To investigate this
remaining source of endogeneity, we implement an instrumental variables approach. Ap-
propriate instruments in this context are variables that aﬀect a store’s capacity choice, but
do not directly aﬀect consumer demand for a title. We instrument for capacity using the
average capacity of the same title across stores of the same tier, as in Ho, Ho, and Mortimer
15(2008). The instrument is meant to reﬂect unobserved capacity costs, such as ordering costs
and stocking costs that vary by title and store size. In all cases we take advantage of the
full variation in the data by taking averages over all stores that take the title, regardless of
the contract type, if a choice of contract type is oﬀered for the title. The validity of this
instrument relies on two assumptions: ﬁrst, that the unobserved costs of taking a particular
title are correlated across stores within a store tier, implying that similar-sized stores make
similar capacity choices; second that demand shocks, except those that are captured by the
store and title ﬁxed eﬀects, are not correlated across markets.
Price
In our data we observe revenues (including late fees) and rentals for each title at each
video retailer, and use this information to calculate an average price for each title at each
store. Based on our calculated average price, we observe relatively little within- and across-
store price variation in our data.
We investigated a number of instruments for price in equation 5, including measures of
average prices of other similar titles. None of the instruments were successful. The issue is
that, after including storeand titleﬁxed eﬀects, the only unobservable we need to instrument
for is at the store-title level. Price variation at this level exists primarily due to re-shelving
titles across various menu prices at diﬀerent rates. For example, after a title has been
stocked at a store for several weeks, the store may remove the “new release” sticker from
the tape and either drop the price or increase the rental period (implying lower collected
late fees and a lower observed price). We believe this source of price variation is primarily
determined exogenously because of the use of rule-of-thumb policies by video retailers in
how they instruct employees to move tapes and update stickers on rental inventory. To the
extent that such activities are endogenously determined, however, estimates of the price
coeﬃcient will be biased upwards.
As our primary approach, we estimate equation 5 without including price as an indepen-
dent variable. We also report results in which rental revenue, rather than transactions, is
used as the left-hand-side variable. The implications of these revenue regressions are almost
identical to those of the rental transaction regressions.17
17Note that if strong price eﬀects exist and endogeneity of price introduces large biases, then excluding price
from the transaction regression should bias the estimates of all coeﬃcients that are potentially correlated
with price. In particular, our estimated capacity eﬀect, which is the measure of interest for this paper, would
be impacted by the exclusion of the price variable. In robustness checks (not reported), we ﬁnd almost no
eﬀect on any of the coeﬃcients of interest from the inclusion of prices on the right-hand side.
165 Results
We categorize each store-title observation based on the supply contract under which the
title was taken (i.e., linear pricing, sell-through pricing, or revenue sharing). Recall that
linear-pricing is associated with the highest upfront cost per tape, and that the retailer
keeps all subsequent rental revenue; sell-through pricing contracts are similar to linear-
pricing contracts, but with a lower upfront cost per tape; and, revenue-sharing contracts
are associated with the lowest upfront cost per tape, but the studio shares in the rental
revenues. We estimate equation 5 separately for each contract type, allowing the impact of
all right-hand-side variables to vary by contract type. For each speciﬁcation, we allow the
impact of capacity to vary by theatrical box oﬃce category.
Before discussing the regression results, we present the distribution of the ratio of rentals
to capacity (Qij/Cij) for A titles under each of the three contract types in ﬁgure 1. The
results for B and C titles are similar, though diﬀerences across contract types are slightly
less pronounced (see ﬁgures 2 and 3).18 These ﬁgures give some indication of potential
diﬀerences in how intensely capacity is used to generate rentals across contract types. Titles
taken on linear-pricing contracts have the largest average number of rentals per unit of
capacity, with each unit producing 27 rentals on average. The average unit of capacity
produces only 17 and 18 rentalsfor A titlestaken on sell-through pricing and revenue-sharing
contracts, respectively. The fact that tapes taken on linear-pricing contracts are used more
intensively is consistent with the higher per-tape costs paid by the retailer for those tapes.
In the next section, we describe the explanatory variables included in the regression models
and we summarize the regression results. Section 5.2 provides the implications for the
marginal impact of capacity on rental transactions and revenues. In order to account for
the potential diﬀerences in capacity eﬀects across rental contracts and box-oﬃce categories,
we present estimates of the marginal impact of capacity on sales separately for each of the
nine contract/box-oﬃce category combinations.
18We do not report a small number of observations with ratios of Qij/Cij that are greater than 100, and
we exclude these observations from the regression analyses. The majority of these observations reﬂect an
obvious error in the coding of either tapes or rentals (i.e., they have unreasonably high average number of
rentals per tape) and their exclusion has virtually no eﬀect on the regression results.
175.1 Regression Speciﬁcations
Table 1 presents results of estimating equation 5 under various restrictions for titles taken
under linear-pricing contracts; results for titles taken on sell-through pricing and revenue-
sharing contracts are presented in tables 2 and 3, respectively. The results in these tables
are from estimating equation 5 for transaction regressions excluding price from the right-
hand side; we report results from the revenue regressions after discussing the transaction
based speciﬁcations. The implications of both models are very similar.19 In all regressions
the t-stats are calculated using robust standard errors with clustering by both store and
title.20
The ﬁrst column in all three tables provides results under the most restrictive speci-
ﬁcation of f(cij,Xij;δ,β). This speciﬁcation contains capacity interacted with box-oﬃce
category, a time trend, and store characteristics, which are store size, the size of a store’s
chain, the total number of titles carried by the store, and demographic information from a
store’s zip code, such as population, median age, and the percentage of the population in
various race, education, marital status, gender, employment, and urban status groupings.
In the speciﬁcation of column one, these characteristics aﬀect the level of rentals, but do
not interact with the capacity eﬀect. As mentioned above, the eﬀect of capacity is allowed
to vary by box oﬃce category. We explain approximately 78 percent of the variation in the
data with this speciﬁcation for linear-pricing titles, and ﬁnd similar R-squares for the other
two contracts (0.82 and 0.79).
The second column in tables 1 - 3 allows for interaction terms between capacity and
store and title characteristics. Speciﬁcally we allow for interactions of capacity and chain
size; a time trend; and each of ten store-size dummies (store tier 1 through store tier 10).
The eﬀects of capacity interacted with chain size and the time trend are further allowed to
vary by box oﬃce category. The R-squareds from these regressions are similar to those in
column 1. To simplify reporting, we do not report coeﬃcients for the interaction of capacity
with store tiers. The coeﬃcients on capacity interactions with the store tier dummies tend
to be smallest for store tiers 1 through 4, and increase slightly for larger store tiers. In other
words, additional capacity for a given title is more valuable at larger stores.
19Transaction regressions that include price without an IV yield similar implied capacity eﬀects.
20For all speciﬁcations of the reported regressions we rely on robust standard errors with two-way clustering
at the store level and at the title level. For the instrumental variables speciﬁcation the instrumented capacity
measure is treated as data.
18In the third column, we add a number of variables that describe the stocking of other
titles at the store, based on a count of the other titles and the capacity taken for those
titles. For new titles taken in the same month as the focal title, we calculate the total
number of other titles taken by the store separately for A, B, and C titles. We then interact
each of these three variables with three box category dummies for the focal title.21 We
make the same calculation for the total number of tapes taken by the store separately
for other A, B, and C titles, and interact this with the three box category dummies for
the focal title. Finally, we make these same calculations for titles released in the month
prior to, and the month following, the release month of the focal title. We lose about
ﬁve to 10 percent of observations due to missing values for prior month and subsequent
month other title variables in the ﬁrst and last month a store is in the Rentrak data. The
coeﬃcients on these other title/tape variables are typically very small and often individually
statistically insigniﬁcant; however, they are jointly signiﬁcant and improve the ﬁt of the
model considerably (i.e., R-squareds increase from 0.79 to 0.81, 0.83 to 0.85, and 0.79 to
0.81 for linear-pricing, sell-through pricing, and revenue-sharing contracts respectively).
Below we discuss the estimated marginal impact of other-title tapes on own-title rentals
and ﬁnd it to be close to zero in most cases.22
We expect a positive bias on the capacity variable in the models investigated in the
ﬁrst three columns because capacity is chosen endogenously by the retailer; conditioning on
the other-title variables and other observable demand shifters should reduce some of this
bias. To further reduce this bias, we include a full array of store and title ﬁxed eﬀects in
the model reported in column four. The ﬁxed eﬀects further improve the ﬁt of the model
(i.e., R-squareds increase to 0.88, 0.90, and 0.87 for linear-pricing, sell-through pricing, and
revenue-sharing contracts respectively). In column ﬁve we also implement an instrumental
variables approach. We instrument for each store’s capacity on a title using the average
21For example, consider a store that stocked 3 new A titles (A1, A2, and A3) and 1 new B (B1) title in
a given month, and suppose that we are looking at the observation for title A1 at that store. We calculate
an “other A title” variable equal to 2, an “other B title” variable equal to 1, and an “other C title” variable
equal to 0. Because the focal title is an A title, we would also have an A title dummy equal to 1, and B and
C title dummies equal to zero. We then interact each of the three “other title” variables with the three box
dummy variables.
22One might also want to check the eﬀects of higher capacity levels for the same title at competing stores.
Unfortunately, we do not observe all stores in the U.S. (we observe approximately 30 percent of all stores),
and we typically do not observe the capacity levels of competing stores in the local market. However, one
expects that cross-eﬀects of titles in the same store are likely to be stronger than eﬀects of capacity across
stores for a particular title in the short run.
19capacity for that title held by stores in other markets in the same store tier. As expected,
the R-squareds decline slightly for this speciﬁcation.
Changes in the coeﬃcients on the log of capacity, as reported in tables 1 - 3, from one
speciﬁcation to another are discussed below, and may be informative with respect to the
mechanisms by which capacitycontributes to rentals. However, the individual coeﬃcients do
not capture the overall impact of capacity on rentals, nor are the changes in these coeﬃcients
necessarily comparable across model speciﬁcations due to the inclusion of diﬀerent sets of
interaction terms. For the overall capacity impact it is necessary to consider all of the
capacity interaction terms with box oﬃce category and store-title characteristic variables,
as well as the log transformation of these variables, which we do in the next section.
For linear-pricing contracts (table 1), the coeﬃcient on the log of capacity increases
slightly between columns 1 and 2 (from 0.97 to 1.07). In column 3, with the addition of
cross-title stocking variables, the coeﬃcient on the log of capacity declines substantially
to 0.62, and it further declines to 0.54 with the addition of store and title ﬁxed eﬀects in
column 4. The T-stat for this coeﬃcient also declines substantially between columns 1 and
4, though in every case the coeﬃcient on the log of capacity is highly signiﬁcant. In column
5, with the addition of an IV approach, the coeﬃcient on the log of capacity further declines
to 0.52 and while it remains statistically signiﬁcant, the T-stat drops substantially (from
10.37 in column 4 to 3.27 in column 5). The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms of the
log of capacity with chain size and a time trend also change substantially when going from
column 4 to column 5.
For both the sell-through pricing (table 2) and the revenue-sharing contracts (table 3),
the coeﬃcient on the log of capacity drops monotonically and substantially from column
1 to column 4 (0.82 down to 0.31 for sell-through pricing contracts, and 0.96 to 0.36 for
revenue-sharing contracts). In contrast to the linear-pricing contracts, estimates of the
coeﬃcient on the log of capacity for both sell-through pricing and revenue-sharing contracts
are negative in column 5 (-0.23 and -0.31 respectively). This change in the log of capacity
coeﬃcient appears to be somewhat oﬀ-set by a substantial increase in the coeﬃcients for
the interactions of the log of capacity with chain size and a time trend.
All of the analyses undertaken in tables 1 through 3 were also implemented using the
log of rental revenue as the left-hand-side variable. The results for the revenue regressions
are reported in tables 4 through 6. As discussed in the next section, the implied capacity
20eﬀects based on the rental revenue and the transaction regressions are very similar.
5.2 Implications
In this section, we report the implied marginal eﬀect on rental transactions from a one unit
increase in the level of capacity in order to provide a more meaningful interpretation of the
regression results. We report the results separately for each regression speciﬁcation and







Where d Qij is the predicted value of rentals based on the regression speciﬁcation. Table 7
reports the marginal own-capacity eﬀects when the equation is evaluated at the average level
of right-hand side variables for store tier 5, which contains medium-sized stores. The table
contains three panels corresponding to linear-pricing, sell-through pricing, and revenue-
sharing respectively.
Column 1 of table 7 reports the implied marginal eﬀect of capacity based on the speciﬁ-
cation in column 1 of tables 1 - 3. This provides an upper bound on the marginal beneﬁt one
might expect from increasing capacity levels for a title because it controls only for contract
type, box oﬃce category, time trend, and store characteristics. Focusing on results in the
top panel for titles taken on linear-pricing contracts, the implied marginal eﬀect of a store
holding one additional tape for an A title under model speciﬁcation 1 is an additional 23.90
rentals (for that title, at that store). We ﬁnd a lower eﬀect of own-title capacity after con-
ditioning on capacity interaction eﬀects (in speciﬁcation 2) with an eﬀect of 23.06, and the
stocking of other titles taken in the same or adjacent release months (speciﬁcation 3) with
an eﬀect of 16.06. After the inclusion of store and title ﬁxed eﬀects (speciﬁcation 4), the
estimate of the own-title capacity eﬀect for A titles taken on linear-pricing contracts falls
further to 14.06 rentals. The decline in the estimated own-title capacity eﬀect is consistent
with the notion that the models are doing an increasingly better job of controlling for bias
resulting from the endogeneity of store capacity choices. Finally, using the instrumental
variables approach combined with the store and title ﬁxed eﬀects to further control for any
remaining bias results in a marginal capacity eﬀect of 10.42 (speciﬁcation 5). The last two
21columns in table 7 report the percentage increase in rentals and the elasticity of rentals
with respect to capacity, using the marginal capacity eﬀect calculated for speciﬁcation 5.
For A titles taken on linear-pricing contracts, the 10.42 additional rentals corresponds to a
2.0 percent increase in rentals and an elasticity of rentals with respect to capacity of 0.44.
Generally, acrossall contract types and box oﬃce categories, our estimateof the marginal
impact of an additional unit of capacity on rentals gets progressively smaller when moving
from speciﬁcation 1 to speciﬁcation 5.23 Within each contract type, an additional unit of
capacity for B and C titles is estimated to have a slightly larger eﬀect on rentals than A
titles (again using the instrumental variables speciﬁcation from column 5). For example,
the marginal eﬀects for B and C titles taken on linear-pricing contracts are 18.01 and
17.01 respectively, compared to 10.42 for A titles. In percentage terms, B and C titles are
estimated to have 6.9 and 17.8 percent increases in rentals (compared to 2.0 percent for A
titles).24
We estimate substantial diﬀerences in the marginal eﬀect of an additional unit of capac-
ity across contract types. Based on the results for speciﬁcation 5, we ﬁnd that the marginal
eﬀect of capacity on rentals was highest for titles taken on linear-pricing contracts, con-
siderably lower for titles taken on sell-through pricing contracts, and lower still for titles
taken on revenue-sharing contracts. For A titles, we estimate that an additional unit of ca-
pacity results in 10.42 additional rentals for linear-pricing contracts, 3.29 additional rentals
for sell-through pricing contracts, and -0.08 change in rentals for revenue-sharing contracts.
For B titles, the estimated eﬀects of an additional unit of capacity on rentals are 18.01, 9.18,
and 2.47 for linear-pricing, sell-through pricing, and revenue-sharing contracts respectively.
Finally, for C titles, the eﬀects are 17.01, 5.10, and 4.85 for linear-pricing, sell-through
pricing, and revenue-sharing contracts respectively. Marginal capacity eﬀects in terms of
percentage changes in rentals and the elasticity of rentals with respect to capacity follow
the same pattern across contract types, as reported in table 7 (for speciﬁcation 5).
Our estimates for the marginal eﬀect of capacity on rentals suggest that the relationship
between capacity and sales is substantially impacted by the adoption of contracts that
23There are two exceptions: B titles under linear-pricing and sell-through pricing contracts show a very
small increase moving from speciﬁcation 4 to 5, when the instrumental variables are used; and the eﬀect for
C titles increases slightly from speciﬁcation 1 to speciﬁcation 3 for all three contract types.
24The coeﬃcients for the interaction of capacity and store characteristics/title characteristics from tables
1 - 3 (speciﬁcation 5) indicate that the marginal eﬀect of an additional unit is: relatively constant over time,
larger for the largest store tiers (tiers 8 through 10), and increasing with respect to chain size.
22lower the cost of capacity. Until the late 1990s, titles were typically made available only
on linear-pricing and sell-through pricing contracts. Our ﬁndings that the marginal impact
of capacity on rentals is far lower on sell-through pricing contracts compared to linear-
pricing contracts is consistent with lower upfront per-tape costs, and consequently, higher
relative capacity levels for sell-through pricing compared to linear-pricing contracts. The
introduction of revenue-sharing contracts in the late 1990s allowed studios to make titles
available at an even lower upfront per-tape cost, close to the studios’ incremental costs of
producing the tapes, while still recovering substantial revenues through the revenue-sharing
component.25 Studios also set minimum capacity requirements for titles taken on revenue-
sharing contracts. We ﬁnd even lower estimates for the marginal impact of capacity on
rentals for titles taken on revenue-sharing contracts, suggesting that the low upfront per-
tape costs and minimum capacity requirements of this contract type encourages even higher
relative levels of capacity.
Our estimated own-title marginal capacity eﬀects are consistent with marginal costs by
contract type and title. That is, the dollar beneﬁt to the video retail store of taking the
last unit of capacity for a title is roughly equal to the cost of obtaining that last unit of
capacity. Using the marginal capacity eﬀects from table 7 (speciﬁcation 5) and applying
average prices, we estimate the marginal beneﬁt to the store of an additional tape.26 For A
titles taken on linear-pricing contracts at tier 5 stores the implied marginal beneﬁt is $30.43
(average price times marginal eﬀect = $2.92 x 10.42), plus any salvage value the retailer
receives from selling the used tape. The average cost of A-title tapes taken on linear-pricing
contracts is approximately $44 (after volume discounts). While this exceeds our estimated
marginal beneﬁt of one additional tape, some of the diﬀerence may be reduced based on
the salvage value from the sale of used tapes (around $9 on average), and other beneﬁts
associated with higher copy-depth for blockbuster titles not measured in our analysis such
as the ability of A titles to draw consumers into the store.27 For B and C titles on linear-
pricing contracts, the estimate of marginal beneﬁt is $51.34 ($2.85 x 18.01) and $45.09
($2.65 x 17.01). The corresponding average costs-per-tape are approximately $43 for B
25Studios typically recover a little less than $30 per tape between the upfront fee and the revenue-sharing
component combined.
26Table 8 presents the corresponding results for the revenue regressions, but in that table the marginal
eﬀects are already in terms of dollars.
27Using the results for the store and title ﬁxed eﬀects without IV (speciﬁcation 4) yields a result very
similar to cost. The marginal capacity eﬀect in that case is 14.06, corresponding to a marginal beneﬁt of
$41.06.
23titles and $42 for C titles.
For titles taken on sell-through pricing contracts, the estimated beneﬁt for A titles is
$9.72 ($2.95 x 3.29), and the average cost of an A-title tape on sell-through pricing contracts
is $15.54. The estimated beneﬁt for B titles is $26.09 ($2.84 x 9.18), and the average cost of
a B-title tape is $15.15. Finally, for C titles the estimated beneﬁt is $13.73 ($2.69 x 5.10),
and the average cost of a C-title tape is $12.53.
For titles taken on revenue-sharing contracts, the estimated beneﬁt is even lower. The
estimated marginal beneﬁt accruing to both the retail store and the studio for A titlesis
-$0.22 ($2.90 x -0.08), and this estimate is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. The average
cost of an A-title tape taken on a revenue-sharing contract is $7.21. Tapes under this
contract also have a salvage value of roughly $9, which is split between the retailer and the
studio. The estimated marginal beneﬁt accruing to both the retail store and studio for B
titles is $7.00 ($2.83 x 2.47); of this beneﬁt, the retail store keeps on average $3.31 after
implementing the revenue-sharing component. The average cost of a B-title tape is $7.28.
Finally, for C titles the estimated total beneﬁt is $13.40 ($2.76 x 4.85), with the retail store
keeping $6.71 and the average cost of a C-title tape on a revenue-sharing contract is $6.41.
Table 8 presents the same information for the revenue regressions, allowing for a direct
calculation of the monetary beneﬁt of additional tapes. As expected, due to the limited
amount of price variability, estimates of the marginal capacity eﬀect are almost identical
whether one uses the revenue regressions or the quantity regressions (multiplied by average
price).
As discussed earlier in the paper, a positive bias on the capacity coeﬃcients may exist if
retailers choose capacity on the basis of unobservable rental demand characteristics. Given
that in most cases our estimated marginal beneﬁt to the retailer of taking an additional
tape is somewhat lower than the cost of the tape, we believe that this endogeneity is
not a major issue for our results using store and title ﬁxed eﬀects and IVs. Figure 4
extends our discussion of results for store tier 5 by plotting the marginal own-title beneﬁt
for linear-priced A titles by store tier against the cost of acquiring an additional tape
(which does not vary by store tier). Figures 5 and 6 report the exercise for titles taken
on sell-through pricing and revenue-sharing contracts respectively. Marginal beneﬁts are
estimated using speciﬁcations 4 and 5 for both the transaction and revenue regressions. The
cost measure does not account for the cost of stocking the tape, the cost of shelf-space, or
24other considerations. The estimated beneﬁt does not account for disposal value of the tape
and other potential beneﬁts of carrying greater levels of capacity, such as increased traﬃc
to the store. The marginal beneﬁt of an additional tape tends to increase slightly with store
size. For speciﬁcation 5, the marginal beneﬁt is somewhat lower than the upfront per-tape
cost for all three contract types and all store tiers, while under speciﬁcation 4 the beneﬁt
is similar to, or slightly higher than upfront per-tape costs.
Table 9 summarizes the own- and selected cross-title marginal eﬀects under speciﬁcation
5 based on the rental transaction regressions. The table contains three panels corresponding
to focal titles that are A titles, B titles and C titles, and each panel contains results for all
three contract types. A-title own-eﬀects (reported in table 7) are referenced in the top row
of the top panel, and are 10.42, 3.29, and -0.08; B- and C-title own eﬀects are also reported
in the ﬁrst row of the second and third panels respectively. For cross-title impacts of the
number of other titles, one could report up to 9 diﬀerent eﬀects for each box-oﬃce category
and contract type: the cross-eﬀects of other titles released in the same (or preceding, or
subsequent) month, and other titles in the same (or 2 diﬀerent) box categories. These eﬀects
are further allowed to vary based on a title’s own box-oﬃce category, which yields a total
of 27 diﬀerent eﬀects. The same calculation can be done using the capacities of other titles
rather than the count of other titles.
In table 9 we report three such cross-title results for each contract type and each box-
oﬃce category; the cross eﬀect of the capacity of other titles in each of the three box oﬃce
categories released in the same month as the focal title.28 For focal titles that are A titles,
the estimated cross eﬀects are all positive, though generally small and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. However, when the focal title is an A title distributed on a revenue-
sharing contract, a one unit increase in the capacity of other A titles released in the same
month is estimated to result in 1.85 additional rentals for the focal title (a statistically
signiﬁcant increase). This result suggests that higher capacity levels of some A titles may
be associated with additional consumer traﬃc to the store, and increased sales for other A
titles. For focal titles that are A titles, the estimated impact of an additional tape taken
for other A titles released in the same month is 0.56, 0.48, and 1.85 for linear-pricing,
sell-through pricing, and revenue-sharing titles respectively. The estimated impact of an
additional tape taken for B titlesreleased in the same month is 2.76, 0.03, and 0.34 for linear-
28Unreported capacity results are cross-eﬀects of the capacity of other titles released in the previous or
subsequent month from the focal titles.
25pricing, sell-through pricing, and revenue-sharing titles respectively; none are statistically
signiﬁcant. Similarly, there is no statistically signiﬁcant impact of an additional tape taken
for C titles, with the estimates being 3.65, 0.48, and 0.75 for linear-pricing, sell-through
pricing, and revenue-sharing titles respectively.29
While all of the estimated cross-eﬀects are positive for focal titles that are A titles, many
of the cross-eﬀects for focal titles that are B titles and C titles are negative. For focal titles
that are B titles, most of the cross-eﬀects are negative. In general, an additional unit of
capacity for other titles is estimated to have an impact of less than one rental for focal titles
that are B titles, and the eﬀect is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. However, similar
to focal titles that are A titles, when the focal title is a B title distributed on a revenue-
sharing contract, an additional unit of capacity for A titles released in the same month is
estimated to result in 1.32 additional rentals for the focal title (a statistically signiﬁcant
increase). This eﬀect is smaller than that estimated for the case where the focal title is an
A title distributed on a revenue-sharing contract (1.85 additional rentals); and, unlike with
focal titles that are A titles, the estimated impact of additional capacity for A titles on
rentals of B titles distributed through linear-pricing and sell-through pricing contracts are
both negative (though not statistically diﬀerent from zero). As a result, while we ﬁnd some
limited evidence that additional capacity of other titles is associated with slightly higher
rentals for A titles, this positive eﬀect (if any) is even weaker for rentals of B titles, and
restricted to B titles distributed on revenue-sharing contracts. For focal titles that are C
titles there is no evidence of cross eﬀects. All of the cross-eﬀects estimates are very small
(some positive, some negative) and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
6 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have identiﬁed strong empirical evidence that greater capacity can sub-
stantially impact sales. In particular, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of additional capacity on sales
can be very large in situations where maintaining high levels of capacity is particularly
costly (e.g., under linear-pricing contracts in our empirical investigation). The adoption of
29Table 10 presents the same information as Table 9, but for the revenue regressions (i.e., where the log of
rentals revenues is on the left-hand-side rather than the log of rentals). In this table the marginal own eﬀect
of capacity is on revenue rather than rentals. For A titles on all three contract types the revenue estimates
are approximately three times higher than the rental transaction estimates, reﬂecting an average rental price
of a little less than $3.
26new monitoring technologies may facilitate new contractual forms and other changes that
greatly reduce the costs of maintaining additional capacity. As a result, retailers may main-
tain higher levels of capacity relative to sales, mitigating any impact of a marginal increase
in capacity on sales (e.g., under revenue-sharing contracts in our empirical investigation).
The theoretical literature has addressed this possible link between capacity and sales, but
empirical evidence has been largely lacking. This paper provides both empirical evidence of
a strong link between capacity and sales, and evidence that the nature of this relationship
can be greatly impacted by new monitoring technologies and supply contracts.
A central challenge for empirically identifying the eﬀect of capacity on sales is the fact
that retailers endogenously choose capacity to maximize proﬁts. In order to address the en-
dogeneity concerns, we take advantage of the panel nature of the dataset to incorporate both
store and title ﬁxed eﬀects in addition to using an instrumental variables approach. The
inclusion of both ﬁxed eﬀects along with an instrumental variables approach signiﬁcantly
reduces the bias resulting from the endogeneity of capacity.
Our main focus in this paper is to identify evidence of capacity eﬀects on sales and
measure the size of that eﬀect in a speciﬁc industry, video rentals. As such, we allow for
several mechanisms through which capacity may aﬀect sales for video rentals, but do not
attempt to identify the impact of any individual mechanism. Larger capacities may reduce
stock-outs, serve as a signal to consumers about product quality, or simply increase sales by
garnering more shelf space. On the other hand, consumers may substitute intertemporally
during stock-outs, mitigating the eﬀect of additional capacity on total sales. For example,
although video rentals tend to peak within a few weeks for a newly released title, consumers
continue to actively rent the title over a period of about four to ﬁve months on average. In
industries with more time-sensitive demand, such as newspaper sales or automobile rentals,




















































































Figure 3: “Rentals-per-tape,” C Titles
29Table 1: The Capacity Eﬀect for Linear-Pricing Titles
Quantity Regression, Dependent Variable ln(Qij)
1 2 3 4 5
log of Capacity (ln(C)) 0.97 1.07 0.62 0.54 0.52
[96.98] [23.56] [10.86] [10.37] [3.27]
ln(C)*Box B 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.11
[0.51] [1.02] [1.58] [2.06] [0.77]
ln(C)*Box C -0.09 0.04 0.55 0.26 -0.52
[-7.01] [0.63] [7.07] [4.65] [-2.69]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03
[-6.89] [-6.52] [-5.17] [12.22]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box B 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
[3.61] [0.21] [0.59] [3.13]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box C 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.05
[4.98] [-1.64] [1.19] [9.79]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend) -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.05
[-0.88] [2.87] [1.24] [-2.97]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box B -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.02
[-1.62] [-1.80] [-1.46] [1.06]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box C -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.12
[-3.25] [-3.48] [-1.70] [3.48]
Store/Title/Time Char? Y Y Y N N
Capacity*Store Tier Interactions? N Y Y Y Y
Cross-Title Stocking? N N Y Y Y
Title/Store FE? N N N Y Y
Instrument? N N N N Y
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.88 0.79
Observations 1,606,583 1,606,583 1,535,472 1,535,472 1,535,385
T-stats are in brackets and all T-stats reﬂect robust standard errors with clustering by both title
and store.
In the ﬁrst-stage regression for column 5, the instrument for capacity is the average level of capacity
for the same title held at other stores of the same tier level. The coeﬃcient on the instrument is
0.02 with a T-stat of 14.4. The ﬁrst-stage regression has an R-squared of 0.71.
30Table 2: The Capacity Eﬀect for Sell-Through Pricing Titles
Quantity Regression, Dependent Variable ln(Qij)
1 2 3 4 5
log of Capacity (ln(C)) 0.82 0.65 0.55 0.31 -0.23
[33.23] [5.96] [6.34] [5.88] [-1.17]
ln(C)*Box B -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 0.15
[-1.89] [-0.42] [-0.63] [-0.94] [0.60]
ln(C)*Box C -0.13 -0.21 -0.61 -0.11 -0.34
[-4.57] [-2.26] [-3.71] [-0.99] [-1.34]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
[1.89] [1.94] [0.03] [4.55]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box B 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
[1.41] [0.65] [0.54] [3.04]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box C 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
[2.40] [1.19] [0.42] [3.29]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend) 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07
[1.38] [3.05] [3.47] [4.52]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box B -0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.04
[-0.01] [-0.23] [1.48] [1.24]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box C 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.06
[0.21] [3.40] [1.49] [1.46]
Store/Title/Time Char? Y Y Y N N
Capacity*Store Tier Interactions? N Y Y Y Y
Cross-Title Stocking? N N Y Y Y
Title/Store FE? N N N Y Y
Instrument? N N N N Y
R-squared 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.90 0.85
Observations 343,116 343,116 316,269 316,269 316,260
T-stats are in brackets and all T-stats reﬂect robust standard errors with clustering by both title
and store.
In the ﬁrst-stage regression for column 5, the instrument for capacity is the average level of capacity
for the same title held at other stores of the same tier level. The coeﬃcient on the instrument is
0.01 with a T-stat of 7.7. The ﬁrst-stage regression has an R-squared of 0.78.
31Table 3: The Capacity Eﬀect for Revenue Sharing Titles
Quantity Regression, Dependent Variable ln(Qij)
1 2 3 4 5
log of Capacity (ln(C)) 0.96 0.94 0.69 0.36 -0.31
[47.61] [13.53] [8.91] [6.33] [-2.52]
ln(C)*Box B 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.13
[2.01] [1.14] [1.19] [0.89] [1.66]
ln(C)*Box C -0.05 0.00 0.34 0.19 0.27
[-2.73] [0.03] [3.58] [2.69] [2.20]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size) -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03
[-2.65] [0.47] [1.39] [5.67]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box B 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[1.97] [4.87] [2.74] [2.24]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box C 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03
[0.57] [5.25] [3.25] [4.43]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend) 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.04
[0.86] [-0.02] [0.94] [3.10]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box B -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.01
[-1.21] [-2.52] [0.00] [0.64]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box C -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.00
[-0.84] [-1.34] [0.68] [-0.09]
Store/Title/Time Char? Y Y Y N N
Capacity*Store Tier Interactions? N Y Y Y Y
Cross-Title Stocking? N N Y Y Y
Title/Store FE? N N N Y Y
Instrument? N N N N Y
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.84
Observations 428,501 428,501 409,113 409,113 408,812
T-stats are in brackets and all T-stats reﬂect robust standard errors with clustering by both title
and store.
In the ﬁrst-stage regression for column 5, the instrument for capacity is the average level of capacity
for the same title held at other stores of the same tier level. The coeﬃcient on the instrument is
0.01 with a T-stat of 9.5. The ﬁrst-stage regression has an R-squared of 0.85.
32Table 4: The Capacity Eﬀect for Linear-Pricing Titles
Revenue Regression, Dependent Variable ln(Revenueij)
1 2 3 4 5
log of Capacity (ln(C)) 1.00 1.09 0.61 0.49 0.39
[95.65] [24.52] [10.43] [9.26] [2.43]
ln(C)*Box B 0.01 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.10
[1.00] [1.19] [1.66] [1.99] [0.70]
ln(C)*Box C -0.09 0.05 0.60 0.25 -0.61
[-7.07] [0.79] [7.63] [4.40] [-3.13]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size) -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.04
[-6.02] [-5.46] [-1.47] [14.51]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box B 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
[3.67] [0.11] [1.02] [3.74]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box C 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.05
[3.99] [-2.62] [0.91] [10.07]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend) -0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.04
[-0.68] [3.47] [1.67] [-2.04]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box B -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.02
[-1.80] [-1.85] [-1.36] [1.15]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box C -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.14
[-3.38] [-3.76] [-1.32] [4.14]
Store/Title/Time Char? Y Y Y N N
Capacity*Store Tier Interactions? N Y Y Y Y
Cross-Title Stocking? N N Y Y Y
Title/Store FE? N N N Y Y
Instrument? N N N N Y
R-squared 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.88 0.78
Observations 1,606,583 1,606,583 1,535,472 1,535,472 1,535,385
T-stats are in brackets and all T-stats reﬂect robust standard errors with clustering by both title
and store.
In the ﬁrst-stage regression for column 5, the instrument for capacity is the average level of capacity
for the same title held at other stores of the same tier level. The coeﬃcient on the instrument is
0.02 with a T-stat of 14.4. The ﬁrst-stage regression has an R-squared of 0.71.
33Table 5: The Capacity Eﬀect for Sell-Through Pricing Titles
Revenue Regression, Dependent Variable ln(Revenueij)
1 2 3 4 5
log of Capacity (ln(C)) 0.86 0.69 0.58 0.31 -0.33
[32.78] [6.27] [6.28] [5.87] [-1.60]
ln(C)*Box B -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 0.08
[-2.04] [-0.51] [-0.66] [-0.50] [0.33]
ln(C)*Box C -0.14 -0.17 -0.61 0.01 -0.36
[-4.46] [-1.82] [-3.32] [0.09] [-1.29]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size) 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.03
[1.47] [3.20] [-0.12] [5.14]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box B 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
[1.37] [0.56] [0.36] [3.25]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box C 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03
[2.03] [0.98] [0.13] [3.35]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend) 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.09
[1.42] [2.77] [4.07] [5.18]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box B 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.06
[0.08] [-0.19] [0.98] [1.86]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box C -0.00 0.11 0.02 0.06
[-0.21] [3.07] [0.69] [1.36]
Store/Title/Time Char? Y Y Y N N
Capacity*Store Tier Interactions? N Y Y Y Y
Cross-Title Stocking? N N Y Y Y
Title/Store FE? N N N Y Y
Instrument? N N N N Y
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.90 0.84
Observations 343,116 343,116 316,269 316,269 316,260
T-stats are in brackets and all T-stats reﬂect robust standard errors with clustering by both title
and store.
In the ﬁrst-stage regression for column 5, the instrument for capacity is the average level of capacity
for the same title held at other stores of the same tier level. The coeﬃcient on the instrument is
0.01 with a T-stat of 7.7. The ﬁrst-stage regression has an R-squared of 0.78.
34Table 6: The Capacity Eﬀect for Revenue Sharing Titles
Revenue Regression, Dependent Variable ln(Revenueij)
1 2 3 4 5
log of Capacity (ln(C)) 0.98 0.95 0.69 0.31 -0.39
[47.69] [13.34] [8.52] [5.83] [-3.18]
ln(C)*Box B 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.12
[1.99] [1.04] [1.08] [0.82] [1.56]
ln(C)*Box C -0.05 0.00 0.35 0.18 0.27
[-2.48] [0.00] [3.50] [2.66] [2.14]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size) -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04
[-1.96] [2.12] [2.57] [6.15]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box B 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
[2.43] [5.03] [2.67] [2.15]
ln(C)*ln(Chain Size)*Box C 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03
[0.62] [5.07] [3.01] [4.25]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend) 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05
[0.99] [0.15] [1.90] [4.16]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box B -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.01
[-1.16] [-2.40] [0.01] [0.67]
ln(C)*ln(Time Trend)*Box C -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00
[-0.76] [-1.25] [0.81] [0.10]
Store/Title/Time Char? Y Y Y N N
Capacity*Store Tier Interactions? N Y Y Y Y
Cross-Title Stocking? N N Y Y Y
Title/Store FE? N N N Y Y
Instrument? N N N N Y
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.85
Observations 428,501 428,501 409,113 409,113 408,812
T-stats are in brackets and all T-stats reﬂect robust standard errors with clustering by both title
and store.
In the ﬁrst-stage regression for column 5, the instrument for capacity is the average level of capacity
for the same title held at other stores of the same tier level. The coeﬃcient on the instrument is
0.01 with a T-stat of 9.5. The ﬁrst-stage regression has an R-squared of 0.85.
35Table 7: Marginal Capacity Eﬀects, Quantity Regressions
Titles Taken on Linear-Pricing Contracts
Table 1, Model Speciﬁcation % Increase in
Rentals Elasticity
dQ/dC 1 2 3 4 5 (Spec. 5) (Spec. 5)
Box A (avg. p=$2.92) 23.90 23.06 16.06 14.06 10.42 2.0% 0.44
[96.98] [82.39] [18.64] [13.89] [4.77]
Box B (avg. p=$2.85) 25.07 25.01 18.13 16.11 18.01 6.9% 0.66
[73.63] [63.58] [39.27] [44.13] [7.39]
Box C (avg. p=$2.65) 20.83 21.14 24.07 18.98 17.01 17.8% 0.63
[58.97] [53.10] [57.84] [64.67] [7.41]
Titles Taken on Sell-Through Pricing Contracts
Table 2, Model Speciﬁcation % Increase in
Rentals Elasticity
dQ/dC 1 2 3 4 5 (Spec. 5) (Spec. 5)
Box A (avg. p=$2.95) 11.86 12.18 11.78 7.08 3.29 0.8% 0.22
[33.23] [28.71] [18.97] [26.78] [1.32]
Box B (avg. p=$2.84) 11.41 11.70 10.41 8.40 9.18 5.1% 0.55
[19.64] [18.18] [11.17] [9.81] [2.69]
Box C (avg. p=$2.69) 10.48 10.89 12.07 9.24 5.10 6.2% 0.30
[17.12] [14.64] [19.70] [23.94] [1.63]
Titles Taken on Revenue-Sharing Contracts
Table 3, Model Speciﬁcation % Increase in
Rentals Elasticity
dQ/dC 1 2 3 4 5 (Spec. 5) (Spec. 5)
Box A (avg. p=$2.90) 15.45 14.60 10.50 6.59 -0.08 -0.0% -0.00
[47.61] [32.24] [19.83] [28.36] [-0.05]
Box B (avg. p=$2.83) 17.04 16.94 10.69 8.87 2.47 0.7% 0.13
[43.87] [36.34] [14.92] [23.64] [1.21]
Box C (avg. p=$2.76) 13.49 13.51 15.48 11.63 4.85 4.2% 0.26
[29.53] [25.71] [32.02] [36.03] [2.50]
Marginal eﬀects are based on coeﬃcient estimates summarized in tables 1 through 3, and are calcu-
lated for the average values for tier 5 stores (a medium store size).
T-stats in brackets.
36Table 8: Marginal Capacity Eﬀects, Revenue Regressions
Titles Taken on Linear-Pricing Contracts
Table 4, Model Speciﬁcation % Increase in
Revenue Elasticity
dRev/dC 1 2 3 4 5 (Spec. 5) (Spec. 5)
Box A 71.33 69.05 47.88 41.47 28.75 1.9% 0.42
[95.65] [80.11] [18.14] [13.50] [4.42]
Box B 74.26 74.20 53.40 47.05 50.34 6.7% 0.65
[74.49] [63.53] [38.86] [42.88] [7.17]
Box C 58.25 58.97 67.27 53.02 45.04 17.3% 0.61
[58.53] [52.37] [57.50] [62.77] [7.17]
Titles Taken on Sell-Through Pricing Contracts
Table 5, Model Speciﬁcation % Increase in
Revenue Elasticity
dRev/dC 1 2 3 4 5 (Spec. 5) (Spec. 5)
Box A 36.98 37.60 36.24 22.05 8.48 0.7% 0.19
[32.78] [27.40] [17.78] [25.76] [1.08]
Box B 33.65 34.31 30.63 25.14 24.83 4.9% 0.53
[20.15] [18.10] [10.70] [10.82] [2.49]
Box C 29.88 30.75 34.41 27.00 12.11 5.4% 0.26
[16.72] [13.91] [19.17] [25.45] [1.29]
Titles Taken on Revenue-Sharing Contracts
Table 6, Model Speciﬁcation % Increase in
Revenue Elasticity
dRev/dC 1 2 3 4 5 (Spec. 5) (Spec. 5)
Box A 45.82 43.34 31.26 19.85 -0.80 -0.0% -0.02
[47.69] [31.67] [19.43] [28.38] [-0.18]
Box B 48.98 48.46 30.78 25.14 5.65 0.6% 0.11
[44.62] [36.31] [15.34] [22.35] [0.96]
Box C 38.43 38.31 43.96 33.09 13.30 4.1% 0.26
[30.20] [25.89] [32.83] [34.94] [2.43]
Marginal eﬀects are based on coeﬃcient estimates summarized in tables 4 through 6, and are calcu-
lated for the average values for tier 5 stores (the median store size).
T-stats in brackets.
37Table 9: Marginal Own- and Cross-Title Capacity Eﬀects on Rentals for A Titles
Quantity Regressions, Speciﬁcation 5
Eﬀects on Rentals (Q)
Contract Type
Linear Price Sell-Through Price Revenue Share
A-Title Marginal Own Eﬀect 10.42 3.29 -0.08
[4.77] [1.32] [-0.05]
A-Title Marginal Cross Eﬀects:
Other A-Title Capacity 0.56 0.45 1.85
[0.53] [1.49] [4.21]
B-Title Capacity 2.76 0.03 0.34
[0.99] [0.05] [0.45]
C-Title Capacity 3.65 0.48 0.75
[1.20] [0.86] [0.48]
B-Title Marginal Own Eﬀect 18.01 9.18 2.47
[7.39] [2.69] [1.21]
B-Title Marginal Cross Eﬀects:
A-Title Inventory -0.13 -0.93 1.32
[-0.66] [-1.83] [2.79]
Other B-Title Inventory -0.39 -0.65 0.15
[-0.64] [-0.55] [0.16]
C-Title Inventory -0.15 0.24 -0.67
[-0.15] [0.17] [-0.40]
C-Title Marginal Own Eﬀect 17.01 5.10 4.85
[7.41] [1.63] [2.50]
C-Title Marginal Cross Eﬀects:
A-Title Inventory 0.02 0.05 0.01
[1.69] [1.89] [0.60]
B-Title Inventory -0.02 0.12 0.04
[-0.56] [1.39] [0.90]
Other C-Title Inventory -0.02 0.09 0.13
[-0.27] [0.74] [1.51]
Cross eﬀects based on the count of tapes taken on other titles for titles released in the same release
month as the observation title, and are calculated for the average values for tier 5 stores (a medium
store size).
T-stats in brackets.
38Table 10: Marginal Own- and Cross-Title Capacity Eﬀects on Rentals for A Titles
Revenue Regressions, Speciﬁcation 5
Eﬀects on Revenues (Rev)
Contract Type
Revenue Share
Linear Price Sell-Through Price Eﬀect Store Share
A-Title Marginal Own Eﬀect 28.75 8.48 -0.80 -0.38
[4.42] [1.08] [-0.18]
A-Title Marginal Cross Eﬀects:
Other A-Title Inventory 2.30 1.60 5.28 2.54
[0.74] [1.76] [4.03]
B-Title Inventory 6.67 0.18 0.92 0.44
[0.80] [0.11] [0.40]
C-Title Inventory 7.38 1.01 1.78 0.85
[0.82] [0.60] [0.40]
B-Title Marginal Own Eﬀect 50.34 24.83 5.65 2.67
[7.17] [2.49] [0.96]
B-Title Marginal Cross Eﬀects:
A-Title Inventory -0.30 -2.28 4.01 1.90
[-0.50] [-1.54] [2.98]
Other B-Title Inventory -1.42 -1.80 0.47 0.22
[-0.82] [-0.51] [0.18]
C-Title Inventory -1.01 0.49 -2.63 -1.24
[-0.36] [0.12] [-0.53]
C-Title Marginal Own Eﬀect 45.04 12.11 13.30 6.66
[7.17] [1.29] [2.43]
C-Title Marginal Cross Eﬀects:
A-Title Inventory 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.02
[1.82] [1.85] [0.57]
B-Title Inventory -0.04 0.36 0.13 0.07
[-0.41] [1.36] [0.97]
Other C-Title Inventory -0.03 0.16 0.37 0.19
[-0.14] [0.45] [1.57]
Cross eﬀects based on the count of tapes taken on other titles for titles released in the same release
month as the observation title, and are calculated for the average values for tier 5 stores (a medium
store size).
T-stats in brackets.
39Figure 4: Linear-Pricing Marginal Eﬀect, A Titles
Figure 5: Sell-Through Pricing Marginal Eﬀect, A Titles
40Figure 6: Revenue-Sharing Marginal Eﬀect, A Titles
41References
Anupindi, R., Dada, M., and Gupta, S., (1998), “Estimation of Consumer Demand with
Stock-Out Based Substitution: An Application to Vending Machine Products,” Mar-
keting Science, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 406-423.
Balachander, S., and Farquhar, P., (1994), “Gaining Moreby Stocking Less: A Competitive
Analysis of Product Availability,” Marketing Science, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 3-22.
Carlton, D., (1978), “Market Behavior with Demand Uncertainty and Price Inﬂexibility,”
American Economic Review, Vol. 68, pp. 571-87.
Dana, J., and Spier, K., (2001), “Revenue Sharing, Demand Uncertainty, and Vertical
Control of Competing Firms,” Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp
223-45.
Dana, J., (2001), “Competition in Price and Availability When Availability is Unobserv-
able,” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp 497-513.
Deneckere, R. and J. Peck, (1995), “Competition Over Price and Service Rate When
Demand Is Stochastic: A Strategic Analysis,” Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 26,
No. 1, pp 148-62.
Gupta, R., and Vrat, P., (1986), “Inventory Model for Stock Dependent Consumption
Rate,” Opsearch, Vol. 23, pp. 19-24.
Ho, K., Ho, J., and Mortimer, J., (2008), “The Eﬀects of Full-line Forcing Contracts,”
mimeo, September, 2008.
Mortimer, J., (2007), “Price Discrimination, Copyright Law and Technological Innovation:
Evidence from the Introduction of DVDs,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
122, pp. 1307-50.
Mortimer, J., (2008), “Vertical Contracts in the Video Rental Industry,” The Review of
Economic Studies, Vol. 75, pp. 165-199.
Nahmias, S., (1989), Production and Operations Analysis, Homewood, IL: Irwin Publish-
ers.
Narayanan, V. and Raman, A., (2000), “Assignment of Stocking Decision Rights under
Incomplete Contracting,” mimeo.
Schary, P. and Becker, B., (1972), “Distribution and Final Demand: The Inﬂuence of
Availability,” Mississippi Valley Journal of Business Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 17-26.
Urban, T., (1995), “Inventory Models with the Demand Rate Dependent on Stock and
Shortage Levels,” International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp.
21-28.
42Urban, T., (2005), “Inventory Models with Inventory-level-dependent Demand: A Com-
prehensive Review and Unifying Theory,” European Journal of Operational Research,
Vol. 162, No. 3, pp. 792-804.
Wolfe, H., (1968), “A Model for Control of Style Merchandise,” Industrial Management
Review, Vol. 9, pp. 69-82.
43